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内容简介:
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls “public goods”–goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
作者简介:
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
Preface, 1971
Introduction
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations
A. The purpose of organization
B. Public goods and large groups
C. The traditional theory of groups
D. Small groups
E. “Exclusive” and “inclusive” groups
F. A taxonomy of groups
II. Group Size and Group Behavior
A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups
B. Problems of the traditional theories
C. Social incentives and rational behavior
III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom
A. Coercion in labor unions
B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice
C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group
D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group
IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class
A. The economists’ theory of the state
B. The Marxian theory of state and class
C. The logic of the Marxian theory
V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups
A. The philosophical view of pressure groups
B. Institutional economics and the pressure group—John R. Commons
C. Modern theories of pressure groups—Bentley, Truman, Latham
D. The logic of group theory
VI. The “By-Product” and “Special Interest” Theories
A. The “by-product” theory of large pressure groups
B. Labor lobbies
C. Professional lobbies
D. The “special interest” theory and business lobbies
E. Government promotion of political pressure
F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies
G. Noneconomic lobbies
H. The “forgotten groups”—those who suffer in silence
Appendix
Index
· · · · · · (收起)
原文摘录:
人类精神有一种奇怪的两重性，在个人之间进行交易，自我利益至高无上，而在个人与国家以及许多私人组织的关系中，自我牺牲又压倒一切。然而，这些充满自我牺牲精神的组织在与其他组织打交道时又都是自私的。
它把宗教的虔诚，骑士的热忱，小市民的伤感这些情感的神圣激发，淹没在利己主义打算的冰水之中。
自私的本性才不会控制人类的行为。 (查看原文)
做一只坚强的崽
2赞
2013-02-18 14:13:28
—— 引自第127页
大经济集团的游说疏通团体是哪些有能力以“选择性的激励”来“动员”潜在集团的组织的副产品。
除游说疏通职能外无任何其他职能的纯政治性组织显然无法合法地强制个人成为该组织成员。
由于这个原因，有许多组织兼有游说疏通职能和经济职能，或兼有游说疏通职能和社会职能，甚至同时兼有此三种职能。 (查看原文)
小蛋蛋
1赞
2014-02-18 15:04:52
—— 引自第166页